ITAT, DELHI BENCH ‘I’:Scope for exclusion of capital gains in computation of book profit under section 115JB of IT Act, 1961

Scope for exclusion of capital gains in computation of book profit under section 115JB of IT Act, 1961

 The long term capital gain included in the net profit prepared under the Companies Act is not deductible from the net profit for the purpose of computing book profit u/s115JB; merely because the long term capital gain is not liable to be taxed under the normal provision of the Act for the reason that the assessee has made investment in specified schemes as contemplated u/s 54EC, it is not correct to say that it is also to be reduced from the net profit for the purpose of computing deduction u/s 115JB when the Explanation to section 115JB does not provide for any deduction in terms of section 54EC meaning thereby that section 54EC has no application in the computation of book profit u/s 115JB.



ITAT, DELHI BENCH ‘I’: NEW DELHI

Growth Avenue Securities Pvt. Ltd.

v.

DCIT

ITA No. 3912/Del/2005

May 22, 2009

RELEVANT EXTRACTS:



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16. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the long term capital gain earned by the assessee is included in the net profit determined as per P&L account prepared as per Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. In other words, it is not the case of die assessee that the capital gain earned by the assessee was not included in the net profit determined as per P&L account of the assessee prepared under the Companies Act. We have perused the audited accounts of the assessee and finds that the auditors in their audit report has stated, amongst others, that, in their opinion, the profit and loss account and the balance sheet are in compliance with the accounting standards referred to in sub-section (3C) of section 211 of the Companies Act, and in their opinion and to the best of their information and according to explanations given to them, the balance sheet and profit and loss account read together with the notes thereon, give the information required by the Companies Act, 1956 in the manner so required and give a true and fair view in conformity with the accounting principles generally accepted in India. In the audited profit and loss account, the assessee has included capital gain (long term) and capital gain (short term) amounting to Rs. 40,57,545/- and Rs. 1,49,422/- respectively. In the notes thereto, it is no-where mentioned and claimed that though the long term capital gain is included in the profit and loss account but it is not includible in the net profit in terms of provisions of Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act or the accounting principles accepted under the Companies Act. It is, thus, not a case of the assessee made out in the audited accounts that the long term capital gain was not includible in the profit and loss account prepared in terms of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. In the computation of book profit under section 115JB, the assessee claimed exclusion of long term capital gain amounting to Rs. 40,57,545/- u/s 54EC of the Act as the assessee deposited an amount of Rs. 41,00,000/- in specified schemes contemplated u/s 54EC of the Act. The assessee, thus, claimed deduction of long term capital gain from book profit by virtue of investment in specified schemes contemplated u/s 54EC of the Act and not because of the reason that the same was not includible in profit and loss account prepared under Part II and Part III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. It is pertinent to note here that the assessee has not made any claim of deduction of capital gain (short term) from the book profit, which goes to show that capital gain as such is not deductible from the net profit prepared in accordance with Part II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. Further, the distinction of capital gain as short term and long term is relevant only for the purpose of computation of income from capital gain and determination of tax payable thereupon under the normal provisions of Income Tax Act, and has nothing to do with the preparation of profit and loss account in accordance with the provisions of Part II and ill of Schedule VI to the Companies Act. In these circumstances, so long as long term capital gain is part of profit included in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with the provisions contained in Part II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, it cannot be excluded from the net profit unless so provided under Explanation to section 115JB of the Act for the purpose of computing book profit under section 115JB of the Act. In the absence of any provision for exclusion of capital gains in the computation of book profit under the above provision, the assessee is not entitled to the exclusion claimed. In other words, section 54EC has no application in the computation of book profit under section 115JB of the Act.

17. The assessee's further case is that since the capital gain arising from the transfer of a long term capital asset was invested in the specified schemes within die specified time as contemplated u/s 54EC of the Act, the capital gain arising to the assessee shall not be charged to tax as so provided in section 54EC of the Act, and as such the same is to reduced from the net profit determined in the P&L account prepared by the assessee while computing "Book-profit" within the meaning of section 115JB of the Act. The Id. Counsel for the assessee has laid down a great deal of emphasis upon the provisions contained in sub section (5) of section 115 JB to contend that since all other provisions of this Act shall also apply to every assessee, being a company, mentioned in the section 115 JB of the Act, the assessee is entitled to reduce the long term capital gain exempted u/s54ECoftheAct.

18. We, therefore, find it necessary to look into sub section (5) of section 115JB of the Act, which reads as "save as otherwise provided in this section, all other provisions of this Act shall apply to every assessee, being a company, mentioned in this section". Having regard to expression "save as otherwise provided in this section" used in this sub section (5) of section 115 JB, we are of the view that the expression "save as otherwise provided in this section 115 JB" clearly means that what is provided in section 115JB should be religiously followed and anything over and above the matter provided in section 115JB will be subject to other provisions of the Act. The provisions of section 115JB has an overriding effect upon other provisions of the Act as is evident from the section itself. The method of computation of book profit provided in Explanation to section 115JB, should, thus, be followed while computing the book profit, and the normal provisions of computation of profit under any head of the Act shall not be applicable. By no stretch of imagination can it be construed as substituting die other provisions of the Act in place of what is specifically made available in section 115 JB in so far as the computation of book profit u/s 115JB is concerned. The entire mechanism for the computation of book profit is clearly set out in sub section (1) of section 115 JB read with Explanation thereto. Not only starring point being the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act but also the items, which are to be increased as stipulated in clauses (a) to (h), and the items, which are to be reduced as specified in clauses (i) to (vii), find separate mentioned in the scheme of the section itself. So, the computation of book profit is to be done strictly as per the Explanation to section 115JB of the Act and no assistance from any other section of the Act can be taken for that purpose. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres Ltd. vs. CIT (supra) and CIT vs. HCL Comnet Systems and Services Ltd. (supra) has clearly laid down a law that the A.O. has the limited power of making increases and reductions to tfie net profit shown in the profit and loss account except as provided for in the Explanation to section 115J or 115JA. In other words, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the A.O., while computing the book profits of a company under section 115 J or 115 JA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has only the power of examining whether the books of account are certified by the authorities under the Companies Act as having been properly maintained in accordance with the Companies Act. The Assessing Officer, thereafter, has the limited power of making increases and reductions except as provided for in the Explanation to section 115Jor 115JAor 115JB, as the case may be.

19. In the light of the discussions made above, it is, thus, clear that the view that the A.O., while computing the book profit of a company u/s 115J or 115JA or 115JB of the Act, as the case may be, has only the power of examining whether the books of account are certified by the authorities under the Companies Act as having being properly maintained in accordance with the Companies Act, and the A.O. thereafter has the limited power of making increases and reductions as provided for in the Explanation to section 115J is settled by a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases.

20. When a deduction of capital gain available u/s 54EC is not covered by any of a clauses (i) to (vii) of Explanation (1) to section 115JB there is no authority for falling upon the command of section 54EC for holding that the capital gain deductible under section 54EC is also to be reduced from the net profit shown in the profit and loss account prepared under the Companies Act for the purpose of computing book profit u/s 115 JB of the Act- If such reduction of capital gain, which is eligible for deduction u/s 54EC of the Act, is allowed to be made form the net profit determined in the profit and loss account prepared by the assessee in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act and laid before the company in its annual general meeting, for the purpose of computing "Book-profit" under section 115JB, it would certainly be against the above referred decisions laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Apollo Tyres vs. CIT (supra) and CIT vs. HCL Comnet Systems & Services Ltd. (supra) wherein the powers of the A.O. while computing the book profits for the purpose of section 115 J or 115 J A were examines and analyzed.

25. It is undisputed fact that the receipt of capital gain has been included in the profit and loss account prepared by the assessee under the Companies Act, and it is now the claim of the assessee that capital gain being exempted u/s 54EC of die Act should not be included in the book profit computed u/s 115JB of the Act. In this regard, we find that the judgement of Hon'ble Mumbai High Court in the case of Veekay Lai Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. reported in 249 ITR 597 (Mum.), which was relied upon by the department in the case of ITO vs. Frigsales Ltd. (supra), is relevant and has important bearing to the controversy arising in the present case. In that case, the assessee filed its return of income declaring a net loss of Rs.29,120/-. In that case, part of land was sold by the assessee and in the return of income, the assessee treated the income derived from the above sale of property as long term capital gain and offered Rs.2.70 lakhs for taxation but as per the P&L A/c for this year, the assessee earned a net profit of Rs. 12,76,119/- but the assessee did not offer any income under section 115 J of the Act on the ground that under section 115 J, one has to take commercial profit and if any receipt has no commercial profit element, then such receipt would have to be excluded for the purposes of section 115 J. It was also the claim of the assessee that commercial profits or profits under section 115J cannot include capital gains. In that case, the Assessing Officer rejected this claim of the assessee. Ld CIT(A) also confirmed the assessment order but the Tribunal took the view that under the Income Tax Act, 1961, capital gain is deemed to be income under section 45. It is also held that the said section applies only to the limited extent and what is deemed to be income under section 45 is not an income for book profit and on this basis, the Tribunal decided tins issue in favour of the assessee. While holding so, the Tribunal followed the judgment of Special Bench of the Tribunal rendered in the case of Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra) In revenue's appeal, this issue was decided by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in favour of the revenue The question before Hon'ble Bombay High Court was as to whether the income from capital gain should be included for the purposes of computing book profit under section 115J of the Act. The findings of Hon'ble Bombay High Court are reproduced below:

"We find merit in this appeal. According to section 115(1), in the case of an assessee being a company if the total income is less than 30% of its book profits then the total income of such company shall be deemed to be an amount equal to 30% of such book profit and such income shall be chargeable to tax. That, the assessee has to first compute the total income in accordance with the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the total income is less than 30% of the book prof it then the assessee has to prepare a profit and loss account for the previous year in accordance with parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act. In other words, a plain reading of section 115J shows that if the assessee is a company and its total income under the Income Tax Act, 1961 is less than 30% of its book profits then, fictionally, it will be deemed that its total income chargeable to tax would be an amount equal to 30% of such book profits. Hence, in such a case, the total income of the assessee is first required to be computed under the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the total income so computed is less than 30% of the book profits then the profit and loss account shall have to be prepared in accordance with Part-II and Part-Ill of Schedule-VI of the Companies Act. The important thing to be noted is that while calculating the total income under the Income Tax Act, 1961, the assessee is required to take into account income by way of capital gains under section 45 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In the circumstances, one fails to understand as to how in computing the book profits under the Companies Act. The assessee company cannot consider capital gains for the purposes of computing book profits under section 115J of the Act. Further, under clause 2 of Part II of Schedule VI to the Companies Act where a company receives the amount on account of surrender of lease hold rights, the company is bound to disclose in the profit and loss account the said amount as non recurring transaction or a transaction of an exceptional nature irrespective of its nature, i.e. whether capital or revenue. That, it would be inappropriate to directly transfer such amount to capital reserve (see Companies Act by A. Ramaiya, page 1669, Fourteenth Edition. Such receipts are also covered by clause 2(b) of Part II of Schedule VI to the Companies Act which, inter alia states that the profit and loss account shall disclose every material feature, including credits or receipts and debits or expenses in respect of non recurring transactions or transactions of an exception nature. Lastly, even under clause 3(xli)(b) profits or losses in respect of transactions not usually undertaken by the company or undertaken in circumstances of exceptional or non recurring nature shows clearly that capital gains should be included for the purpose of computing book profits. That capital gains would certainly be one of the various items whose information is required to be given to the shareholders under the said clause 3(xii)(b). So also, the disclosure is required to be made in respect of investment in the capital of a partnership firm if the company is a partner on the date of the balance sheet (see page 165) of the Companies Act by A. Samaiya, fourteenth edition). Similarly, profits or losses on such investments are also required to be disclosed (see clause 3(xii)(b) of Part-II of Schedule VI to the Companies Act.

In the circumstances, the question is answered in the affirmative, i.e. in favour of the Department and against the assesses. "

34. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above and in view of the above reasons, we upheld the order of Id. CIT(A) in holding that (the long term capital gain included in the net profit prepared under the Companies Act is not deductible from the net profit for the purpose of computing book profit u/s 115 JBJ We further hold that merely because the long term capital gain is not liable to be taxed under the normal provision of the Act for the reason that the assessee has made investment in specified schemes as contemplated u/s 54ECS it is not correct to say that it is also to be reduced from the net profit for the purpose of computing deduction u/s 115JB when the Explanation to section 115JB does not provide for any deduction in terms of section 54EC)of the Act. In other words, we hold/that section 54EC has no application in the computation of book profit u/s 115JB)of the Act. To sum up, we hold that in the absence of any provision for exclusion of capital gains exempted u/s 54EC in the computation of book profit under the provisions contained in Explanation to section 115JB, the assessee is not entitled to the exclusion thereof as claimed. The order of Id. CIT (A) is, thus, upheld, and tins ground raised by the assessee is rejected.

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HIGH COURT OF DELHI Advance in ordinary course of carrying on business cannot be considered as ‘dividend’ within meaning of section 2(22)(e) of IT Act, 1961

Advance in ordinary course of carrying on business cannot be considered as ‘dividend’ within meaning of section 2(22)(e) of IT Act, 1961

 

Once it is held that the business transactions do not fall within section 2(22)(e), one need not to go further to section 2(22)(e)(ii) to take away the basic meaning, intent and purport of the main part of section 2(22)(e).

HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CIT

v.

Creative Dyeing & Printing Pvt. Ltd.

ITA No. 250/2009

September 22, 2009

RELEVANT EXTRACTS:

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9. In the present case the Tribunal on considering decisions in various cases held as under:

“From the ratio laid down in above cases and on the basis of judicial interpretation of words. ‘Loans’ or ‘Advances’, it can be held that section 2(22)(e)can be applied to ‘Loans’ or ‘Advances’. Simplicitor and not to those transactions carried out in course of business as such. In the course of carrying on business transaction between a company and a stockholder, the company may be required to give advance in mutual interest. There is no legal bar in having such transaction. What is to be ascertained is what is the purpose of such advance. If the amount is given as advance simplicitor or as such per se without any further obligation behind receiving such advances, may be treated is ‘deemed dividend’, but if it is otherwise, the amount given cannot be branded as ‘advances’ . Within the meaning of deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e). Just as per clause (ii) of section 2(22)(e), dividend is not to include advance or loan made by a company in the ordinary course of business where the lending of money is a substantial part of the business of the company advance in the ordinary course of carrying on business cannot be considered as dividend within the meaning of section 2(22)(e). By granting advance if the business purpose of the company is served and which is not the sum, which it otherwise would have distributed as dividend, cannot be brought within the deeming provision of treating such ‘Advance’ as deemed dividend ”

10. We agree with the aforesaid observations. The finding of facts, arrived at by the Tribunal in the present case is that the transaction in question was a business transaction and which transaction would have benefited both the assessee company and M/s. Pee Empro Exports Pvt. Ltd. In fact, as stated above, the counsel for the appellant has conceded that the amount is in fact not a loan but only an advance because the amount paid to the assessee company would be adjusted against the entitlement of moneys of the assessee company payable by M/s. Pee Empro Exports Pvt. Ltd. in the subsequent years.



11. The counsel for the appellant has very strenuously urged that neither the Tribunal nor the judgment o f this Court in Rajkumar .s case (supra) deals with that part of the definition of deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e) which states that deemed dividend does not include an advance or loan made to a shareholder by a company in the ordinary course of its business where the lending of money is a substantial part of the business of the company [Section 2(22)(e)(ii)] i.e. there is no deemed dividend only if the lending of moneys is by a company which is engaged in the business of money lending. Dilating further the counsel for the appellant contended that since M/s. Pee Empro Exports Pvt. Ltd. is not into the business of lending of money, the payments made by it to the assessee company would therefore be covered by Section 2(22)(e)(ii) and consequently payments even for business transactions would be a deemed dividend. We do not agree. The Tribunal has dealt with this aspect as reproduced in para (9) above. The provision of Section 2(22)(e)(ii) is basically in the nature of an explanation. That cannot however, have bearing on interpretation of the main provision of Section 2(22)(e) and once it is held that the business transactions does not fall within Section 2(22)(e), we need not to go further to Section 2(22)(e)(ii). The provision of Section 2(22)(e)(ii) gives an example only of one of the situations where the loan/advance will not be treated as a deemed dividend, but that .s all. The same cannot be expanded further to take away the basic meaning, intent and purport of the main part of Section 2(22)(e). We feel that this interpretation of ours is in accordance with the legislative intention of introducing Section 2(22)(e) and which has been extensively dealt with by this Court in the judgment in Raj Kumar .s case(supra). This Court in Raj Kumar .s case (supra) extensively referred to the report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission and the speech of the Finance Minister in the Budget while introducing the Finance Bill. Ultimately, this Court in the said judgment held as under:

“10.3 A bare reading of the recommendations of the Commission and the Speech of the then Finance Minister would show that the purpose of insertion of clause (e) to section 2(6A) in the 1922 Act was to bring within the tax net monies paid by closely held companies to their principal shareholders in the guise of loans and advances to avoid payment of tax.

10.4 Therefore, if the said background is kept in mind, it is clear that sub-clause (e) of section 2(22) of the Act, which is pari material with clause (e) of section 2(6A) of the 1922 Act, plainly seeks to bring within the tax net accumulated profits which are distributed by closely held companies to its shareholders in the form of loans. The purpose being that persons who manage such closely held companies should not arrange their affairs in a manner that they assist the shareholders in avoiding the payment of taxes by having these companies pay or distribute, what would legitimately be dividend in the hands of the shareholders, money in the form of an advance or loan.

10.5 If this purpose is kept in mind then, in our view, the word ‘advance’ has to be read in conjunction with the word ‘loan’. Usually attributes of a loan are that it involves positive act of lending coupled with acceptance by the other side of the money as loan: it generally carries an interest and there is an obligation of repayment. On the other hand, in its widest meaning the term ‘advance’ may or may not include lending. The word ‘advance’ if not found in the company of or in conjunction with a word ‘loan’ may or may not include the obligation of repayment. If it does then it would be a loan. Thus, arises the conundrum as to what meaning one would attribute to the term ‘advance’. The rule of construction to our minds which answers this conundrum is noscitur a sociis. The said rule has been explained both by the Privy Council in the of Angus Robertson v. George Day (1879) 5 AC 63 by observing “it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them” and our Supreme Court in the case of Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1991 SC 754 and State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha A IR 1960 SC 610.”

12. Therefore, we hold that the Tribunal was correct in holding that the amounts advanced for business transaction between the parties, namely, the assessee company and M/s. Pee Empro Exports Pvt. Ltd. was not such to fall within the definition of deemed dividend under Section 2(22)(e). The present appeal is therefore dismissed.



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HIGH COURT OF DELHI Liability of NIIT to deduct tax at source u/s 194-I of IT Act, 1961 qua payments made to its franchisee under infrastructural claims.

Liability of NIIT to deduct tax at source u/s 194-I of IT Act, 1961 qua payments made to its franchisee under infrastructural claims.


Where the broad objective of the agreement between the NIIT and the franchisee was to share the revenue from the business of running education centre jointly and not to hire the premises provided by the NIIT, the NIIT was not liable to deduct the taxes under section 194-I in respect of the amount shared by it and remitted to the franchisee for infrastructure claim.

HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CIT

v.

NIIT Ltd.

ITA No. 1107/2008

September 22, 2009

RELEVANT EXTRACTS:

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6. In the facts of the present case, we find that the order of the Tribunal is correct and must be upheld. The relations between the parties in the present case are not of a lessor and lessee as has been sought to be contended by the Revenue. A reference to the clauses of the agreement which has been placed on record shows that a limited license is granted by the assessee company to Sh. Ashok Arora and Sh. Ashish Bhatia(i.e the licencee) for use by the licensee of the trademark and trade name of the assessee company for the education centre. The assessee company granted the license for the purpose of the Agreement within the specified territory the use of it .s confidential technical know how contained in its manuals and any improvements and developments to such know how. The licensee was given the right to operate the education centre in relation to marketing of NIIT courses specified in the agreement. Various other terms and directions could be issued by the licensor to protect its technical knowhow and its trademark/trade name. The agreement further provided for sharing of the fees received from the students. The charges which were payable to the assessee company by the licensee were not fixed and were variable as per the number of students. The assessee company instead of giving a deposit which it would have done if it was a tenant in fact receives a security deposit from the licensee. There are other clauses with regard to the term of the license agreement, its renewal, indemnification, effect of default and so on. The assessee never got possession of the premises and there is no minimum guarantee in the agreement.



7. Reading of the agreement therefore clearly shows that the agreement was in fact a franchises agreement and it cannot be said that by the agreement, rent was in fact being paid by the assessee company to the licensee. No doubt, the charges have been broken up under two heads viz that of, marketing claim and infrastructure claim. However, the agreement is an agreement as a whole and such a composite agreement cannot be broken up as is sought to be done and contended by the Revenue. The provision of section 194I cannot be read to break up composite contracts and when that is not the intention of the parties themselves. If, the interpretation of the Revenue is accepted then, in a case where there is a partnership and one of the partner brings in his capital in the form of his premises from where the partnership business is carried on, then, payment made to such partner by the firm can be stretched to be included in the definition of rent under Section 194 I, and which surely cannot be the intention of the legislature.



8. We find that the Tribunal has given the following valid finding and which we uphold :

“The appellant is entered into the agreement with the Franchisees for running the education centre at various Metro Cities. The fees was shared between the assessee and the Franchisee as per the clauses of the agreement. The details of provisions regarding conduct of the business were stipulated in the franchisee. The dominant intention of the parties of the agreement was to conduct the business not mere letting out of the building, furniture and fixture. The amount to be shared with the Franchisee was variable and it was not fixed. There was no minimum guarantee amount which the assessee was to make. The composite arrangement in the essence of the agreement for conducting the business. The essence of agreement is to conduct the business of running education centre jointly. Mere certain rights of the assessee to protect the business interest stipulated in the agreement would not change the essence of the agreement. The share of the Revenue with the Franchisee is on account of composite services provided by the Franchisee. In view of these facts, we hold that the broad objective of the agreement between the assessee and the Franchisee was to share the revenue and certainly it was not hire the premises provided by the assessee. Therefore, the assessee is not liable to deduct the taxes under section 194-I of the act in respect of the amount shared by the assessee and remitted to the Franchisee for infrastructure claims.



9. None of the judgments cited by the revenue have any bearing with the facts of the present case. Those judgments only deal with the meaning of ‘rent’, however, the definition has to be necessarily applied in the context of the facts of each case, and on so doing in the facts of the present case, we find that there is no payment of rent by the assessee company to the licencees/franchisees.



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Gifts of Property (Gifts-in-Kind) above Value of Rs.50,000/- become Taxable from 1st October 2009

The Income Tax Act 1961 (the Act) has been amended with effect from 1st October 2009 to provide that any gift-in-kind, being an immovable property or any other property, the value of which exceeds Rs.50,000 /- (rupees fifty thousand), will become taxable in the hands of the donee, being an individual or a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), as income from other sources under clause (vii) of sub-section 2 of section 56 of the Act.

Therefore, any such person who receives a gift of any such property on or after 1st October 2009 must pay the income tax due on the value of the gift and disclose the taxable value of such property in the return of income for assessment year 2010-11 and subsequent years.
The following types of gifts will, however, not be subject to tax, i.e. gifts

(a) from a person who is a relative;
(b) on the occasion of marriage of the individual;
(c) under a will or by way of inheritance;
(d) in contemplation of death of the donor;
(e) from any local authority as defined in the Explanation to section 10(20) of the Act;
(f) from any fund or trust established under section 10(23C) of the Act;
(g) from any trust or institution registered under section 12AA of the Act.
Relative is defined in the Act as

(i) spouse;
(ii) brother or sister;
(iii) brother or sister of the spouse;
(iv) brother or sister of either of the parents;
(v) any lineal ascendant or descendant;
(vi) spouse of any of the relative at clauses (ii) to (v); of the individual.

Gifts received from these relatives will not be subject to tax.

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Income tax forms

Income Tax Forms.

     

Income Tax Return PDF Format	Income Tax Return Utility for online filing	Income Tax Return Excel Format	Income Tax Return Word Format	Applicability
ITR 1	Excel Utility (Version 1.0)	ITR 1	ITR 1	For Individuals having Income from Salary/ Pension/ family pension & Interest
ITR 2	Excel Utility (Version 1.0)	ITR 2	ITR 2	For Individuals and HUFs not having Income from Business or Profession
ITR 3	Excel Utility (Version 1.0)	ITR 3	ITR 3	For Individuals/HUFs being partners in firms and not carrying out business or profession under any proprietorsh
ITR 4	Excel Utility (Version 1.0)	ITR 4	ITR 4	For individuals & HUFs having income from a proprietary business or profession
ITR 5	Excel Utility (Version 1.0)	ITR 5	ITR 5	For firms, AOPs and BOIs
ITR 7	Excel Utility (Version 1.0)	ITR 6	ITR 6	For Companies other than companies claiming exemption under section 11
ITR 7	Not Applicable	ITR 7	ITR 7	For persons including companies required to furnish return under section 139(4A) or section 139(4B) or section 139(4C) or section 139(4D)
ITR 9	Not Yet Released	ITR 8	ITR 8	Return for Fringe Benefits
ITR V (Acknowledgement)	Not Applicable	ITR V (Acknowledgement)	ITR V (Acknowledgement)	Where the data of the Return of Income/Fringe Benefits in Form ITR-1, ITR-2, ITR-3, ITR-4, ITR-5, ITR-6 & ITR-8 transmitted electronically without digital signature