Friday, October 16, 2009

Announcement regarding service tax for November, 2009 Examinations - (15-10-2009)

Rate of service tax reduced from 12% to 10%







In addition to the Notifications and Circulars given in the Appendix to the RTPs for November, 2009, students may note that rate of service tax has been reduced from 12% to 10% with effect from 24.02.2009 vide Notification No. 8/2009-S.T. dated 24-2-2009. The said notification is relevant for the following mentioned papers in November, 2009 examinations:-


  • Part –II : Service tax and VAT of Paper 5 : Taxation of Professional Competence Examination


  • Part –II : Service tax and VAT of Paper 4 : Taxation of Integrated Professional Competence Examination


  • Paper 8 : Indirect taxes/ Paper 8 : Indirect Tax Laws of Final Existing/New Examination


posted at www.taxmannindia.blogspot.com

Saturday, October 10, 2009

HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Scope for reduction of amount withdrawn from revaluation reserve and credited to P&L account for purpose of computing book profit u/s 115JB of IT Act, 1961


Prior to insertion of the proviso to clause (i) of the Explanation of section 115JB the assessee was entitled to reduce the sum from revaluation reserve while computing book profit under section 115JB; however, after the insertion of the proviso to clause (i) of Explanation to section 115JB, the assessee has been deprived from this benefit by clearly mandating that in case the amount of such reserve has not been added back by the assessee in relevant assessment year i.e. when the assessee created the revaluation reserve while computing the book profit for that year, then the amount is statutorily to be included while computing the book profit under section 115JB.


HIGH COURT OF DELHI


Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd.


v.


CIT


ITA No. 851/2009


September 22, 2009

RELEVANT EXTRACTS:

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3 That the relevant provision of Section 115 JB proviso to clause-(i) of Explanation 1 reads as under:-



“115JB.---Special provision for payment of tax by certain companies



(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, where in the case of an assessee, being a company, the income-tax, payable on the total income as computed under this Act in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2001, is less than seven and one-half per cent of its book profit, such book profit shall be deemed to be the total income of the assessee and the tax payable by the assessee on such total income shall be the amount of income –tax at the rate of seven and one-half per cent.



(2) Every assessee, being a company, shall; for the purposes of this section, prepare its profit and loss account for the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of Parts II and III of Schedule VI of the Companies Act; 1956 (1 of 1956): ...

Explanation 1- For the purposes of this section, “book profit ” means the net profit as shown in the profit and loss account for the relevant previous year prepared under sub-Section (2), as increased by- ..... .... .... ....

if any amount referred to in clauses (a) to (h) is debited to the profit and loss account, and as reduced by-

(i) the amount withdrawn from any reserve or provision (excluding a reserve created before the 1st day of April, 1997 otherwise than by way of a debit to the profit and loss account), if any such amount is credited to the profit and loss account Provided that where this section is applicable to an assessee in any previous year , the amount withdrawn from reserves created or provisions made in a previous year relevant to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 1997 shall not be reduced from the book profit unless the book profit of such year has been increased by those reserves or provisions (out of which the said amount was withdrawn) under this Explanation or Explanation below second proviso to section 115JA, as the case may be ;or] .... .... ....”



4. The Tribunal while interpreting said section has very effectively and exhaustively looked at the issue and given the finding with which we concur.

 The ITAT has held as under:-



“61. Now looking into the provision of section 115JB of the Act, we find that proviso to clause 1 of the explanation inserted/substituted w.e.f. 1.4.97, the reserves of any nature, except other than reserve specified under section 33 AC, if debited to P&L Account is to be added back to the book profits of the assessee company. From any reserve or provision, if any, such amount credited to P&L Account is required to be reduced from P&L Account after adjustment as specified in causes (a) to (f). insertion/substitution of clause (i) of aforesaid explanation it was open to the assessee to reduce the sum withdrawn from revaluation reserve, while computing book profit, amounts withdrawn from provision/reserve and credited to P&L Account, even if in the year in which the provision/reserve had been created but the amount of such reserve had not been added back while computing book profit for that year, not withstanding that the reserve had been debited to the P&L Account. provisions of section 115JB it is clear that prior to insertion of the proviso to clause (i) of the explanation of section 115 JB the assessee was entitled to reduce the sum from revaluation reserve while computing book profit under section 115JB of the Act even if in the year in which the provision/reserve had been created but the amount of such reserve has not been added back while computing book profit for that year not withstanding that the reserve had been debited to P&L Account. However, after the insertion of the proviso to clause (i) of explanation to section 115JB of the Act, in similar facts and circumstances, the assessee has been deprived from this benefit by clearly mandating that in case the amount of such reserve has not been added back by the assessee in AY 2000-01, i.e. when the assessee company created the revaluation reserve while computing the book profit for that year, then the amount is statutorily to be included while computing the book profits under section 115JB of the Act. What we interpreted herein above is just a result of a plain reading of the relevant provisions, which are devoid of any ambiguity or doubt so no other meaning could be ascribed thereto. We are further of the opinion that the Tribunal is bound to give literal interpretation to ambiguous provisions of the Act and not interpret them in any other manner which are against the wisdom of the creators of the statute who created/amended the provision with the intention that the same is to be followed while considering the issues depending on the application thereof. Hence, we are also duty bound to adhere to the plain meaning of the section in the manner as indicated above and apply the same while deciding the issue.”



6. We are of the opinion that since there is no dispute that the provision of clause (i) of Explanation-1 to Section 115 JB is applicable to the issue in question and the language of the same being plain and clear, we agree with the view of the Tribunal on the interpretation of this provision as stated by it in para 61 and as reproduced by us above. In fact, it is not disputed that the assessee company takes benefit of additional depreciation on account of revaluation of the fixed assets by increasing the revaluation reserve in the relevant assessment year 2000-2001 and consequently, the same definitely has the effect of reducing the net profit for the said Assessment Year. Looking to the scheme of the provision of Section 115 JB, and which is a Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) provision and so introduced by the legislature to be applicable to those companies which avoid paying tax by debiting in the profit and loss account, various expenses/entries etc as specified in Section 115 JB Explanation-1 such as Income Tax paid or payable, amounts carried to any reserve, provision of losses for subsidiary companies, the amount of depreciation etc as provided in the provision. A normal literal interpretation of the provision is, therefore, the order of the day with respect to this MAT provision.

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HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA Applicability of section 194J of IT Act, 1961 in case of Third Party Administrator (TPA) providing health insurance claim services.

Applicability of section 194J of IT Act, 1961 in case of Third Party Administrator (TPA) providing health insurance claim services.

Having regard to the agreement entered into inter se between the hospital and the TPA for payment of money to the hospital, it cannot be said that the TPA, who is the authority or the person to pay the amount to the hospital, is not required to deduct the tax at source and section 194J is not attracted.

HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

The Medi Assist India TPA Pvt. Ltd.

v.

DCIT (TDS)

Writ Petition No. 11376 of 2009

August 13, 2009


JUDGEMENT

Per: Ajit J Gunjal:

The petitioner is in all these writ petitions is questioning the order passed by the first respondent under section 201(1) and 201 (1A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short the Act"), for the respective assessment years. The petitioner is also questioning the show cause notice issued on 19.1.2009, pursuant to which Annexure-H has been passed.

2. The facts in a nut-shell are as follows:

The petitioner is a Third Party Administrator licensed by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority under the Third Party Administrator Health Services Regulations, 2001 (for short TPA Regulations"). The petitioner is engaged in the business of providing health insurance claim services under various Health Insurance Policies issued by several Insurers. The services include providing cashless service through Network Hospitals and settlement or reimbursement of claims in accordance with the terms of the Health Insurance Policies. The petitioner also provides for 24x7 Call Centre Services to the Health Card holders on various aspects of Health Insurance Claims. Pursuant to regulation 2 (h) of the T.P.A. Regulations, an agreement is entered into between TPA and insurance company registered under section 3 of the Act, prescribing the terms and conditions of health services, which may be rendered to and received by each of the parties thereto. It is the specific contention of the petitioners that TPA agreement would cover 'health insurance business' or 'health cover' as defined in regulation 2(f) of the Registration of Indian Insurance Companies, Regulations, 2000 (for short "IRDA Regulation"). But, however, it does not include business of an insurance company or the soliciting, directly or through an insurance intermediary including an insurance agent Suffice it to say that a number of individuals or groups of individuals take medi-claim policies by paying annual premia and avail medical insurance benefits provided by certain Insurance Companies. Apparently there is a contract of insurance between the insurance company and the individual who takes the medi-claim policy. But however subject to the terms and conditions exclusions and definitions contained in the policy. The insurance company undertakes that if during the subsistence of the policy any insured person who contracts any disease or suffers from any illness or sustain any bodily injury through accident and if such disease or injury requites and any such insured person is required to be treated by a physician or medical specialist or medical practitioner etc; would pay through TPA to the insured person or hospital or nursing home. It also stipulates that such injured person is required to be treated by a qualified physician, medical specialist, medical practitioner etc. Indeed that would provide easy and convenient access to the healthcare services for the insured persons. The Insurance Company enters into Service Level Agreement (SLA) with TPA for settling the insurance claims among other obligations and duties as mentioned in the SLA. The TPA settles the bills raised by hospitals or in some cases reimburses the insurance claims to the policy holders, from a separate account which is claim float account Indeed the insurance company deposits certain amounts which are made available to the TPA. As and when the amount in the said claim float account diminishes, it has to be replenished by the insurance company. The TPA in order to provide better services to the policy holders of the insurance company enters into an memorandum of understanding (MoU) with various hospitals and nursing homes. Under the MoU, the TPA gives an undertaking to the hospitals to reimburse/ settle the bills of the policy holders. The Memorandum of Understanding inter alia allows the policy holders to be treated in the hospital without the policy holder making any payment i.e., cashless facility. The payment of reimbursement/ settlement of insurance claims is done in two ways - (1) when the policy holder gets treatment for a medical condition and pays by himself directly to the hospital and (2) when a policy holder gets himself treated at the Network hospital which has an agreement with the TPA to treat the patients who are their members on cashless basis. The TPA processes the medical documents for reimbursement of the medical expenses incurred by the policy holder and the amount is paid. According to the petitioners an individual will not come within the ambit of section 194J of the Act, to as much as, the payments are made in fulfillment of the contractual obligations between the insurance company and the policy holder and not towards rendering any professional services. Hence, according to the petitioners, sections 194J are not at all attracted to these payments.

3. The first respondent conducted the survey on 2.1.2009 under section 133A of the Act of the business premises of the petitioner and collected certain information including the details and copies of returns of the income filed by the petitioner for the years ending 31.3.2006, 31.3.2007 and 31.3.2008. The petitioner also furnished details of the TDS for the assessment years 2006-07, 2007- 08, and 2008-09. The petitioner was called upon by the first respondent to furnish additional details in this regard. The petitioner was later on served with a show cause notice dated 19.1.2009 proposing to pass orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act. According to the petitioners, the said show cause notice was issued by the respondent before collecting the relevant information and before ascertaining the facts from the petitioner. Be that as it may, the petitioner was called upon to show cause why orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act should not be passed. The petitioner raised a preliminary objection to the show cause notice denying the applicability of the provisions of section 194J to the petitioner's case. The main contention of the petitioner is that the hospitals to which the payments were made by the petitioner have filed their returns of income and paid tax due thereon. Hence no action under section 201(1) of the Act could be enforced against the petitioner. Before the competent authority the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Coco-Cola Beverage (P) Ltd., vs. CIT, reported in 293 ITR 226 a copy of which is produced as Annexure-D.

4. The Assessing Authority having regard to the show cause notice as well as the reply given was of the view that the petitioner was obliged to deduct the tax at source; that having not been done, there is a clear violation of the provisions of section 194J of the Act. The total sum payable for the relevant year ie., for the year 2002-03 was Rs.14,78,042/-. The said determination is assailed in this writ petition.

5. Mr. Sarangan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently submit that in the given set of circumstances, section 194J of the Act is not at all applicable. He submits that the explanation to section 194J of the Act deals with the contents of the agreement. Another primary contention of Mr. Saranmgan, learned senior counsel is that sufficient opportunity was not given to the petitioner to put forth their case. It is specifically contended that it is in violation of principle of natural justice. It is also submitted that no opportunity was given to file objections to the equitable claim with the reduction of income. On these grounds he submits that the impugned order holding that section 194J of the Act is applicable to the petitioner is unsustainable.

6. Mr. Aravind, appearing for the respondent Revenue submits that the petitioner is carrying on the business of profit in respect of Health Insurance claim services. He further submits that under section 133A of the Act a survey was conducted and the information received was not in compliance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. He submits that prior to amendment to section 201, there was a controversy that any person who has failed to comply with the provisions of the Act in not deducting the TDS at source was not liable to be treated as default assessee. But, however the amendment was introduced clarifying the position that if a person including the principal officer of a company does not comply with the provisions of the Act by not deducting the TDS, will be treated as assessee in default. Hence he submits that section 194J of the Act is applicable to the case on hand.

7. To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to look into certain provisions of the Act. Section 194J of the Act would relate to fees for professional or technical services. Sub-section (1) of Section 194J would deal with individual or a Hindu undivided family, who is responsible for paying to a resident any sum by way of fees for professional services, or fees for technical services, shall at the time of credit of such sum to the account of the payee or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by other mode, whichever is earlier, deduct an amount equal to five per cent of such sum as income tax on income comprised thereto. The said provision i.e., section 194J (A) and (B) is qualified by indicating that no deduction shall be made under this section in respect of certain payments which are made where the amount does not exceed a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in the case of fees for professional services and other technical services. The professional services is defined under explanation to Section 194J(B) which would mean service rendered by a person in the course of carrying on legal, medical, engineering or architectural profession or the profession of accountancy or technical consultancy or interior decoration or advertising or such other profession as is notified by the Board for the purpose of section 44AA or of this section. Fees for technical services shall have the same meaning as in explanation 2 to clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 9. These are the broad classifications which would attract deduction of the income tax at source under section 194J of the Act.

8. Section 201 of the Act deals with consequences on failure to deduct or pay the tax which is due. Sub-section (1) speaks about the cases referred to in section 194. The principal officer and the company of which he is the principal officer does not deduct the whole or any part of the tax or after deducting fails to pay the tax as required by or under the Act, he shall without prejudice to any other consequences which he or it may incur be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the tax. Sub-section (1A) was introduced on 1.4.1966 which would indicate that notwithstanding what is stated in sub-section (1), if any person, principal officer or company as is referred to in that sub-section does not deduct the whole or any part of the tax or after deducting fails to pay the tax as required by or under the Act, he shall be liable to pay simple interest at 12% per annum on the amount of such tax from the date on which such tax was deductible to the date on which such tax is actually paid. These are the broad provisions which would relate to if the tax is not deducted at source.

One will have to consider whether the petitioners would come within the ambit of section 194J as well as section 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act.

9. The facts relating to TPA are also referred to along with the relevant provisions. Before considering the case on merits, whether the petitioner was obliged to deduct tax at source, it is necessary to see whether the proceedings disclose that the impugned order at Annexure-H is passed in violation of the principle of natural justice and without affording an opportunity, the matter requires remittance. If it is found that sufficient opportunity was given, the question of remitting the matter would not arise. In this regard one will have to look into the impugned order passed by the authority. Indeed it is not in dispute that a show cause notice was issued and a reply is filed. The authority has specifically dealt with the issuance of the show cause notice to the assessee and a reply was also sought which was given by the petitioner. The assessee replied to the show cause notice and the same is extracted in the impugned order. Thereafter the authority has dealt with the applicability of section 194J of the Act and also whether the provisions of sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act are attracted.

10. It is also required to be looked into whether there is any lack of application by the authorities, in as much as, the reference to some cases is made in the impugned order which does not relate, to the petitioner's case.

11. In so far as those contentions are concerned, the impugned order discloses that the agreement with the insurance company which is referred to at para 9 no doubt gives an impression that the agreement which is referred to may not be in respect of the petitioner company. But, however, that shall not alter the situation. Indeed, in so far as denial of an opportunity is concerned, some reference can be made to the correspondence inter se between the petitioner as well as the authority. The first of the correspondence is at Annexure-D dated 29.1.2009, wherein a show cause notice was given and a reply would indicate that they have denied that they are liable to deduct the tax at source under section 194J of the Act for the reasons stated in the reply. But, however, they would make a request that they are not in a position to collect the relevant data and material which are in the nature of agreement between the insurance and third party administrator; agreement between the insurance company and the policy holder; agreement between the third party administrator and the hospitals; agreement between the policy holder and the hospital and agreement between the insurance company and the hospitals. That would conclude the said reply with a request that they are not in a position to collect the data of this magnitude and it would require some more time. Hence two weeks time was sought to submit all the details. Another communication on 2.2.2007, a copy of which is at Annexure-E reiterating the fact that they would require some more time to collect the necessary information. Another letter dated 5.2.2009 at Annexure-F is also to the effect that they were in the process of collecting the balance of data as required by them. The last of the communication dated 12.3.2009 which would once again seeking some more time to do the needful at the earliest and once they are in receipt of the copies they will be in a position to give a comprehensive reply to the show cause notice. That was received by the authority on the same day. Nevertheless, the authority has proceeded to pass an order dated 23.7.2009. It is no doubt true that a request was made on 12.3.2009 in seeking some more time to collect the data and file a comprehensive reply. Indeed it is not a case where it can be said that the petitioners are denied of an opportunity, in as much as, on several occasions time was granted and the petitioners have filed a reply. What was lacking is only the documents which were not available which are the TPA agreement Indeed the question is not one of interpretation of the terms of the TPA agreement but as to whether the petitioners who are third party administrator are required to deduct tax at source. Undisputedly the insurance company has entered into an agreement with the petitioners herein for the purpose of payment or reimbursing the amount which is spent by the policy holder. Indeed it is to be noticed that the insurance company issued cashless medi-claim policies and they are serviced through the TPAs. It is required to be looked into as to how this TPA operates. Indeed any policy holder who is desirous of availing the benefit of medi-claim policy is required to enter into a contract with the insurance company. Under the said contract the policy holder is insured and is assured of a free treatment up to a limit not exceeding the sum assured. Indeed the insurance company enters into an agreement with the TPAs to service their policies. The working of this arrangement is whenever a person is insured the insurer would send the copy of the policy to a particular TPA, the TPA in turn issues certain identity card to the insured, the policy holder thereafter is required to approach the said TPA for the service. The TPAs have a network of hospitals with which it has arranged for cashless treatment, which is informed to the insured. If the policy holder or insured is in need off medical treatment he can approach any of the network hospitals to avail the said cashless benefit. The normal procedure would be the hospital sends the requests to the TPA and upon their approval the police holder would be treated in the hospital. After the treatment and discharge, the hospital sends the bill along with the investigation report to the TPA and the TPA upon receipt of the documents processes for reimbursement of the medical expenses. Once the claim is processed the payment is released to the hospital by the TPA directly. Indeed the TPA gets reimbursed of all the amount of claim processed. In the case on hand, it is to be noticed that the TPA normally takes a list of insurance companies in settling the claims of the policy holder. Since the money is paid from the 'claim float account' of the TPA, it is the TPA who is responsible for making payments to the hospital under cashless system under the medi-claim service to the policy holder. In fact the role of TPA can be termed as the agent of the insurance company. It is no doubt true that a contention is taken that they are not responsible for payment of sums as there is no approved contract for rendering the professional service. The agreement which is made available along with the papers would clearly disclose some of the conditions laid down in the agreement which are as under:

(1) The hospital is required to provide necessary medical treatment;

(2) The hospital will not provide cashless benefit to any beneficiary without authority letter;

(3) After beneficiary is discharged from the hospital the provider will submit original final bill amongst other documents;

(4) All payments in respect of the complete/eligible bills shall be made by the TPA directly to the provider.

Thus a perusal of the agreement itself discloses that the TPA is responsible for making the payment to the hospital for rendering the medical service to the policy holders. The TPAs enter into an agreement with the hospitals for the aforesaid purpose. It is not necessary as to when the services are required to be provided by the TPA. Services can also be said to have been provided if they are provided through some one else on the request of the TPA. Indeed the TPA is given unbridled power in this regard. This would be in the nature of TPA taking over a part of the work of the insurance company. The TPA would be working in the nature of the insurance company except the fact that they do not issue policy. Their decision as to the payment of bill and sending the insured to the accredited hospitals is final. Indeed it is to be noticed that after taking the policy from the insurance company, the insurance company is not in touch with the insured at all, in as much as, they are not required to process the claim for approval. The decision of the TPA in this regard is final.

12. Another factor which would be a pointer to the fact that the TPA is required to deduct tax at source is to be found in the nature of operation of funds. A claim float account is opened in the name of tine TPA. The insurer would go on depositing certain sums of money in the said float account from which the TPA would draw the amount and pay the amount to the hospitals. As and when the amount. In the float account is diminished or reduced, the insurer would replenish the account. The TPA is required to open float fund account with a designated bank specified by the insurer. The amount is transferred from the account of the insurer after the claim process and payment is made. As observed once the funds are exhausted the same would be replenished by the insurer. Indeed it is to be noticed that it is the TPA which is in control of making the payments to the hospitals. The liability of the insurer is only of replenishing of the funds. After the transfer of funds the control of the funds is with the TPA i.e., when once the amount is deposited in the float fund account. The application of the funds is left to the contracting party i.e., the insured and the TPA. A perusal of the network and as to how the cashless medi facility is made available, the ultimate party who pays the amount to the hospital is the TPA. In fact there is no agreement between the insurer and the hospitals. The agreement is essentially between the TPA and the hospitals. In this regard it is necessary for us to look into the agreement itself which is made available, which is termed as Service Level Agreement.

13. Clause 2 of the agreement would relate to the services, which would read that the TPA agrees to provide the services by itself in the service area in the panel of GIPSA Companies outside the service area to the insurer and the insured persons on the terms and conditions and in the manner more particularly set out in the agreement. What is service fees is to be found in clause 3, which would indicate that the insurer shall pay to the TPA the fees as detailed in the schedule. Clause 3.2 of the agreement would relate to the applicable taxes and other levies of the Govt or any Governmental authority in relation to the fees payable, shall be borne by the insurer provided the TPA is regular payee of service tax and they are having the service tax account with the concerned department of the Government which should be mentioned in the service charge bill raised by the TPA. Indeed, a perusal of this clause does not give any indication that the TPA is not obliged to deduct the tax at source, which would be with reference to only to the service tax.

14. The petitioners have also made available the hospitals which are on the panel of the TPA. One such agreement with empaneled hospital is made available along with the petition papers. The agreement entered into between the TPA as well as the hospital has certain obligations to the reperform on either part. It would relate to procedure for approval cashless admission and treatment which would indicate that in the event any TPA member is required to be admitted and treated by the hospital, as may be planned in advance, the hospital shall promptly send to the medi assist (petitioner) by fax or e-mail or any other communication as may be designated by the petitioner from time to time, The said clause would also indicate that the hospital shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the request of cashless beneficiary is duly filled and completed by the hospital as the TPA member only sends the request for cashless hospitalisation at the designated place. There are hosts of other clauses which are required to be performed by the hospital including emergency hospitalization and processing of request for cashless hospitalisation. Processing of request form for cashless hospitalization is to be found at clause 4 of the agreement with the hospital which would indicate that it is at the sole discretion of the Cashless hospitalization with the petitioner. What is more relevant for our purpose to determine as to whether the TPA is required to deduct tax at source is to be found at clause 3.5. Indeed it would read that on receipt of the authorization letter by the hospital, the hospital shall admit and treat the approved TPA members, the charges for which shall be reimbursed by medi assist to the hospital on behalf of the insurance company that the approved TPA members is a medi-claim policy holder of, subject to the terms and conditions of the authorisation letter issued by the Medi-assist and the agreement For the purposes of the agreement, that is the hospital, the approved TPA member shall mean those TPA members with respect to whose admission and treatment at the hospital, to which the TPA has issued an authorisation letter in accordance with the terms of the agreement Payments to be made are to be found at clause 5. Clause 5.1 would relate to the obligation on the part of the TPA to reimburse the hospital on behalf of the insurance company with the approved TPA member who is a medi claim policy holder and under no circumstance the TPA is required to pay the hospital any amounts that will not be reimbursed by the insurance company.

15. A perusal of the terms of payment would clearly indicate that it is the duty and the obligation of the TPA to pay the hospitals. Indeed the insurer in this regard will not have any role to play, in as much as, it is only to replenish the amount in the float account once the amount deposited therein is exhausted. Ultimately the agreement entered into inter se between the hospital and the TPA for payment of money holds the field. In the circumstance, it cannot be said that the TPA who is the authority or the person to pay the amount to the hospital is not required to deduce the tax at source and section 194J is not attracted cannot be accepted.

16. A feeble attempt was made by Mr. Sarangan, learned senior counsel with reference to the definition of profession under section 2(36) and business under section 2(3) and profits and gains, to buttress his contention that it is only the profession and business which are required to deduct the tax at source under section 194J, He would also press into service the provisions of sections 121 of the Act which would relate to direct payment and section 28 which would relate to profits and gains from the business and profession. I am of the view those provisions do not advance the case of the petitioner, in as much as, they are required to be looked into with regard to the terms of the agreement whether section 194J and sections 201(1) and 201(1A) of the Act are attracted.

17. A perusal of the impugned order does not indicate that it has not addressed itself to the contentions urged. Having re-examined the matter, I am of the view that the impugned order cannot be faulted and the petitioner is obliged to deduct the tax at source under section 194J of the Act, in as much as, moneys are paid by it to the hospitals in respect of cashless treatment.

18. Having given my anxious consideration, I am of the view that the petition does not merit consideration and the same is rejected.



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 posted at www.taxmannindia.blogspot.com

ITAT, NAGPUR BENCH Allowability of exemption under section 54EC of IT Act, 1961

Allowability of exemption under section 54EC of IT Act, 1961

When there is no bar to take possession by an agreement and transfer can be treated to have taken place on the basis of an agreement and advance payments deposited in specified bonds as required under section 54EC, simply because the sale deed was executed later on, the assessee cannot be charged with default of violation of the provision of section 54EC.


ITAT, NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

Bhikulal Chandak (HUF)

v.

ITO

ITA No. 81/Nag/2009

June 17, 2009


RELEVANT EXTRACTS:

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6.2 Section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act. 1982 reads as follows:

“Whether any person contracts to transfer for consideration am immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. ' and the transfer has in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in pan performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or. where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:

Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights oi' a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof."

6.3 Therefore, if by way of a part performance of a contract as contemplated in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e. agreement to sale) the assessee has received advance payments and deposited the same in specified bonds, he cannot be charged of defrauding the law. Holding this view of the matter, we emphatically hold that when there is no bar to take possession by an agreement and transfer can be treated to have taken place on the basis of an agreement and advance payments. Simply because the sale deed was executed later on the assessee cannot be charged with default of violation of the provision of section 54EC in this particular case.

6.4 Even with regard to ownership of house property, the
Hon’ ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd.
reported in 226 IT R 625 has held that under the common law
"ownership” means a person who has got valid title legally conveyed to him after complying with the requirements o[ law such as the Transfer of Property Act. the Registration Act etc., in the context of section 22 of the Income-tax Act. 1961. Having regard to the ground realities and further having regard to the object of the Income-tax Act. Namely, to tax the income, "owner*" is a person who is entitled to receive income from the property in his own right. The requirement of registration of the sale deed in the context of section 22 is not warranted.

7. Even without going to all the strict interpretation, even otherwise on receipt of advance as per the agreement, if the assessee deposited the amount as required us 541-C. he cannot be treated as a defaulter for the same.

8. With the aforesaid analytical observation on both the factual aspect as well as the aspect on legal interpretation, we decline to agree with the CIT for invoking section 263 in this particular case. As per the provision of section 263, neither by the conduct of the assessee there is loss to Revenue nor the conduct of the assessee is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; rather the assessee was fair enough to deposit the amount immediately after receipt of the same as advance payments on the basis of the agreement to sale. Therefore, invoking of section 263 is totally unjustified and accordingly the same is quashed.

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ITAT, COCHIN BENCH (THIRD MEMBER) Scope for denial of exemption under section 11 of IT Act, 1961 to a trust having both religious & chartitable objects

Scope for denial of exemption under section 11 of IT Act, 1961 to a trust having both religious & chartitable objects

A religious purpose can be a charitable purpose and vice versa in India; therefore, exemption cannot be denied to a trust which is partly charitable and partly religious.

ITAT, COCHIN BENCH (THIRD MEMBER)

The Society of Presentation Sisters

v.

ITO

ITA No. 457/Coch/2007

September 22, 2009

RELEVANT EXTRACTS:

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19. It is clear from plethora of authorities where after considering provisions of section 1l(l)(a) that so for as aforesaid provision is concerned, no distinction is made between charitable and religious purposes. A charitable institution can have religious purposes; whereas a religious institution may be partly charitable. Most of the decisions were given under 1961 Act. Even where decision was on consideration of 1922 Act, there is no material difference as is demonstrated in the above discussion. Their Lordship of Supreme Court have held, as noted earlier, that charitable and religious purpose overlaps in India. Even otherwise relief and help to the poor, medical help to the needy, looking after of deity and temples (mosque, church included) are no doubt religious purposes but these are also considered as charitable in India. Therefore, the view taken in the two cases before me that exemption u/s 11(1 )(a) cannot be allowed to a charitable trust as it is also carrying some purposes which are termed as 'religious' is totally unwarranted. Above view is totally contrary to well established and settled law in India, as laid down by their Lordship of Supreme Court.

20. Although there is no distinction between religious or charitable institution as for as section ll(l)(a) is concerned, such distinction is recognised u/s 13 which is an exception to section 11 and 12 of the Act. Cases which are covered under clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 13 would not be entitled to exemption u/s 11 or 12 of the Income-tax Act. Clause (a) of above section relates to income from property under a trust for private religious purposes which does not enure for the benefit of the public. Clause (b) deal with cases of charitable institution created or established after the commencement of the Act. It is required to be seen whether such charitable trust or institution is established for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste. If it is so established, then provisions of section 11 will not be attracted. But for application of above clause, it is to be shown that income of the trust ensures and used or applied directly or indirectly for the benefit of the persons referred to in sub-section (3). Clauses (c) and (d) are applicable to both type of trusts i,e. trust for charitable or religious purposes, unlike in clauses (a) and (b) which were applicable to private religious trust or to charitable trust The Legislature has specifically used in clause (c) the words "trust for charitable or religious purposes". Clauses (c) and (d) would be applicable to trust which is either for charitable purposes or for religious purposes or partly charitable and partly religious. In other words, if such trust is established only for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste, then the provision of section 11 would not be applicable. But the position would be different and in case of a trust or institution for religious purposes, wherein certain activities termed as charitable activities are also carried for the benefit of a religious community or caste, clause (b) would have no application in such a case.

21. In these cases, the revenue authorities did not make out any case u/s 13(l)(b) or any other clause of the section. There is no finding that trusts in question are charitable institutions created or established for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste. As already submitted, provision of clause (b) of section 13(1) is applicable only to a charitable institution and not to any institution which is created both for charitable and religious purposes. There is no elaboration as to how any particular religious community or caste is to be benefited from the trust in question. No violation of provision of section 13 of the Act has been stated or established. The finding or basis for denial of exemption u/s ll(l)(a) is that trusts are partly religious and partly charitable, whereas exemption is permissible to wholly charitable or wholly religious trusts. Such basis is not legally tenable.

22. In the case of The Society of Presentation Sisters, the Assessing Officer noted expenses under the following four heads:

1. Chapel running expenses

2. Chapel articles

3. Religious books, and

4. Religious functions

According to the AO above objects were religious. After considering objects of

the trust, he observed that objects (a) to (h) are charitable. Out of these, object (g)

is noted as under:

"(g) To effect hospitals, infirmaries, dispensaries, chapels, convents, bungalows, schools, hospitals, orphanages, homes for the aged."

According to the A.O, erection of chapels and convents were religious in nature.

Accordingly purpose of the trust was held to be partly religious and partly charitable and exemption denied to the assessee. It is difficult to appreciate or agree with aforesaid conclusion. How erection of chapels and convents can be treated purely religious in nature and not charitable. No relevant facts have been brought on record to make out a case justifying denial of exemption u/s 1 l(l)(a). There is no finding that chapels and convents are to serve a particular community and the purpose would be hit by provisions of section 13(l)(b). Besides as already recorded^ religious purpose can be a charitable purpose and vice versa in India. Therefore, exemption could not be denied to a trust which is partly charitable and partly religious, in the light of above discussion.

23. In the other case of Wayanad Muslim Orphanage Committee, the Assessing Officer concluded that maintenance of Mosque and Madrassas were religious activities which contravene provisions of section 11(l)(a). The purposes of the trust were held to be partly charitable and partly religious. Therefore, exemption was denied to the assessee.

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